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] the high transaction cost of small loans;
] perception of high risk of lending to small-scale
borrowers; and
] lack of traditional collateral demanded by banks.
Thus, two government corporations, namely, the
Quedan Rural Credit and Guarantee Corporation and the
Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, and
one program, the Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium
Enterprises under the Livelihood Corporation, a govern-
ment corporation under the Office of the President, pro-
vide loan guarantee to small-scale borrowers.1
What are the basic assumptions that warrant the
use of loan guarantee schemes? One, financial markets
are imperfect and exclude certain clientele, e.g., small-
scale borrowers, from the borrowing process. Two, banks
are unwilling to provide loans to these excluded clientele
because of perceived loan-recovery risks resulting from
lack of acceptable loan collateral. Three, loan guaran-
tees provide banks with a loan security that effectively
reduces loan-recovery risks. Loan guarantees, therefore,
provide an insurance against loan defaults by risky
borrowers. The guarantees essence is the transfer to a

*a.k.a. "The Tale of the Elephant that Gave Birth to a Mouse. This
draws on several studies on loan guarantee programs in the Philippines
(Orbeta, Lopez and Adams 1998;  Llanto and Magno 1993; and Llanto,
Casuga and Magno 1991). The Orbeta study was undertaken under the
auspices of the National Credit Council. Llanto and others studies were
sponsored by the Agricultural Credit Policy Council.
1The Department of Agricultures Comprehensive Agricultural Loan
Fund (CALF) also used the Philippine Crop and Insurance Corporation to
provide loan guarantees to rice and corn farmers.
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Arguments for a Loan Guarantee
In an attempt to provide small-scale borrowers like
small farmers and fisherfolk, rural enterprises and oth-
ers, with access to formal credit, the government has
made use of loan guarantee schemes. The government
believes that loan guarantee programs can address sev-
eral barriers to loan access by small-scale borrowers.2
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"As a result of improvements in the
programs, the institutions claim that
many of the guaranteed loans went to
borrowers who would otherwise not have
been able to obtain bank loans...large
guaranteed loans made to marketing
intermediaries indirectly benefited
numerous poor people who obtained
subsequent informal loans from the
intermediaries."
third party, the loan guarantee agency, or the government
in case of a sovereign loan guarantee, a portion of the
loan recovery risks associated with lending to small-scale
borrowers.
The question now is: are the loan guarantee
schemes working?
In this regard, this Policy Notes issue revisits previ-
ous studies assessing the performance of these pro-
grams. Based on these
studies' finding that said
schemes failed to address
the problem of providing
small-scale borrowers with
access to formal credit, this
Notes recommends that an
immediate review of this
type of government inter-
vention in the credit mar-
kets be made.
] Private bank participation in the loan guaran-
tee programs was low;
] Guarantee fees paid covered only a small frac-
tion of the cost of operating these programs; and
] Time-consuming procedures in the programs
contributed to a high transaction cost of borrowing.
The 1993 study, meanwhile, concluded that:
] There is little difference in the characteristics
and transaction costs be-
tween borrowers with loan
guarantees and those with-
out; and
] Loan guaran-
tees failed to substitute for
traditional forms of collat-
eral.
The conclusions in the
Gudger (1994) and Seibel
(1995) studies are very
similar to the findings of lo-
cal researchers, with Seibel
making extensive use of lo-
cal researchers previous
data and information on the loan guarantee programs.
Attempts to Improve the Programs
There have been attempts, of course, on the part
of loan guarantee institutions to reform their respective
programs based on the assessment done by local re-
searchers. For example, changes in procedures have
somehow addressed certain features of the programs.
As a result of improvements in the programs, the institu-
tions claim that many of the guaranteed loans went to
borrowers who would otherwise not have been able to
obtain bank loans. For instance, the large guaranteed
loans made to marketing intermediaries indirectly ben-
efited numerous poor people who obtained subsequent




Two local (Llanto and Magno 1993; and Llanto,
Casuga and Magno 1991) and two foreign (Gudger 1994;
Seibel 1995) studies had previously assessed the per-
formance of the three loan guarantee programs earlier
mentioned. All reported a generally negative result,
namely, that the loan guarantee scheme has failed to
motivate bank lending to small-scale borrowers.
In the 1991 study, the following were the overall
findings:
] The total number of loans given on the strength
of a loan guarantee was small;
] Other forms of collateral secured many of the
loans covered by the loan guarantee;3
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"...Programs are heavily subsidy-
dependent and their implementation will
mean continuing substantial subsidies
since their operating expenses far
exceeded guarantee fee receipts."
Most Recent Study
Recently, Orbeta, Lopez and Adams (1998) did an-
other study on the programs performance. The study
used two complementary frameworks, namely, the over-
all benefit-cost framework and a framework looking at
the outreach and the sustainability of the programs. The
benefit-cost framework compared the social and private
benefits of the programs with their costs. The second
framework compared the outreach with the costs of the
programs. Outreach refers to the number of new borrow-
ers who received loans because of the loan guarantee.
Sustainability refers to whether the programs can con-
tinue to exist without additional subsidies from taxpay-
ers.
To assess the performance of the three loan guar-
antee programs, Orbeta, Lopez and Adams made use of
various reports on the loan guarantees, financial state-
ments and files of the guarantee agencies and partici-
pating lenders, and interviews of participants in loan guar-
antee programs in and around Manila, Batangas, Cebu
City, General Santos City and Nueva  Ecija.
The studys findings are:
] The loan guarantee programs failed to stimu-
late bank lending to excluded (target) groups. Their out-
reach has been disappointingly limited. The number of
loans being guaranteed is small and the additional num-
ber of loans that were stimulated by the guarantee
schemes is an even smaller number;
] These programs are heavily subsidy-dependent
and their implementation will mean continuing substan-
tial subsidies since their operating expenses far exceeded
guarantee fee receipts; and
] Most policy options that might increase program
outreach will further worsen the problems of sustainability
and subsidy-dependency. Escalating guarantee claims,
excessive operating expenses, and inflation are rapidly
eroding the real values of the  guarantee funds. Without
hefty periodic infusions of government funds, these pro-
grams run the risk of collapsing.
Recommendation
An audit should be done as soon as possible on
the three loan guarantee institutions. Audits should in-
clude actuaries who will document the extent to which
future guarantee claims and loan losses are accurately
booked. Auditors should also provide estimates of the
life of each of these programs without further subsidies.
Based on the results of these audits, policymakers
could then make decisions about the future of these
schemes. That decision might involve liquidating the guar-
antee programs and using the remaining funds for other
efforts that have a more positive impact on poverty re-
duction.  4
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